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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENDANGERED SPECIES
CASE LAW
Sean C. Skaggs
The recent controversy over spotted owls and logging rights in
the Pacific Northwest has polarized proponents of species
conservation and proponents of development. Not since the infamous
snail darter threatened to prevent the operation of a multi-million
dollar hydroelectric project has the tension between continued
economic and technological development and natural resource
conservation been presented so starkly. It is in this environment that
the Endangered Species Act of 1973;(ESA) must come up for
reauthorization. As a result of the spotted owl controversy, the Bush
administration has indicated that it will attempt to have the ESA
amended.2
If amendments to the ESA are attempted, the focus will be on
providing greater involvement for the "God Committee," a decision
making body which can exempt a project from the restrictions of the
ESA, and incorporating economic factors into the endangered species
analysis.5 The changes are unlikely to affect the bulk of endangered
species cases, however, and the ESA in its present form continues to
merit close study.
Although the ESA receives widespread attention only when a
situation like the spotted owl controversy arises, it has in fact become
an increasingly pervasive and important statute which has begun to
reach almost every human activity involving land use. The ESA has
been the basis for litigation of a diverse variety of human activities,
ranging from oil and gas exploration"* and timber harvesting,5 to the
1. 16 U.S.C §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
2. The Cost of Saving Species, 7(4) ENVTL. F. 28, 28 (1990).
3. Id.
4. Connor v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 489 U.S.
1012 (1989).
48 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
registration of pesticides6 and the diversion of water.7 The scope of
the ESA encompasses all actors: federal and state agencies and
private individuals. Recent litigation interpreting the ESA has
expanded the reach of the Act, enhancing the conservation of species
under the ESA. This article discusses recent developments in ESA
case law, particularly the recent expansive interpretations of section
7(a)(l) and section 9.
SECTION 7(A)(2): INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
Section 7(a)(2) brings the consideration of protected species
into the decision making process of federal agencies. Section 7(a)(2)
requires that federal agencies insure that their actions are not likely
to jeopardize the continued survival of protected species.8 The
requirement to insure no jeopardy to the continued survival of a
protected species has been the most litigated section of the ESA. In
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,9 the Supreme Court established
that section 7(a)(2) required federal agencies to give "first priority
to the declared national policy of saving endangered species."70
Sections 7(b) through 7(d) provide a procedural process that
5. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part and
vacated in part sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
6. Defenders of Wildlife v. E.P.A., 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989).
7. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir.
1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985).
8. ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). The Fish and Wildlife Service
regulations provide that the continued existence of a species would be "jeopardized"
if the action "reasonably would be expected directly or indirectly to reduce
appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in
the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species." 50
C.F.R. § 402.02 (1990).
9. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
10. Id. at 185. For a discussion of the background of TVA v. Hill, see Plater,
Reflected in a River: Agency Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN.
L. REV. 747 (1982).
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facilitates compliance with the requirement of section 7(a)(2)/7
Early cases interpreting section 7 established that this section
acted as a mandate to all federal agencies to consult with the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) concerning the effect of their actions on protected species/2
Recent cases have continued to develop the procedural
requirements of section 7. In Connor v. Burford,13 the Ninth Circuit
limited incremental-step consultation under section 7(a)(2); the court
held that biological opinions prepared in fulfillment of the section
7(a)(2) duty must consider the full impact of the action. The Ninth
Circuit recognized that incremental-step consultation had been upheld
on a number of occasions when the action involved oil and gas lease
sales made pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, but
declined to expand the incremental-step consultation approach to
other situations.74 The Ninth Circuit held that a biological opinion
that focused only on the initial stages of an agency action failed to
meet the procedural requirement to use the best available data/5
11. ESA § 7 (b)-(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (b)-(d).
12. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Roosevelt
Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. E.P.A., 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982); National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 979
(1976); Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156
(D. Neb. 1978). Cf. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976)
(consultation does not require acquiescence). For a discussion of the early cases,
see Erdheim, The-Wake of the Snail Darter: Insuring the Effectiveness of Section 7 of
the Endangered Species Act, 9 ECOLOGY L. Q. 629 (1981). See also, Rosenberg,
Federal Protection of Unique Environmental Interests: Endangered and Threatened
Species, 58 N.C.L. REV. 491 (1980).
13. 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988).
14. Burford, 848 F.2d at 1456-57. For decisions approving incremental-step
consultation in the context of oil and gas lease sales under OCSLA, see False Pass
v, Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d
589 (D.C Cir. 1980).
15. Burford, 848 F.2d at 1453.
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Following Burford, the Ninth Circuit again held that biological
opinions need to consider all post leasing activities/6 In Sierra Club
v. Marsh,17 the Ninth Circuit established that the requirement to use
the best available data was a continuing obligation. If new
information concerning the impact of an action on a species comes
to light, the agency has a duty to reinitiate consultation/8 This
continuing obligation insures that the affect of an action on a
protected species is analyzed using only the best available data.
The scope of section 7(a)(2) has been expanded recently in
two important areas. Species which are to be considered for listing
are now protected and federal agency actions outside U.S. boundaries
must now comply with section 7(a)(2).
Protection for Species Wfiich Are Awaiting Listing Determinations
The growing number of species awaiting determinations for
placement on a protected list caused Congress to amend the ESA to
provide protection for species which were proposed for listing, but
which had yet to be listed.79 In Enos v. Marsh,20 the Ninth Circuit
established the requirements federal agencies must meet when dealing
with species proposed for listing. The Ninth Circuit held that when
action is going to affect species proposed for listing, the federal
agency must confer with the FWS informally and obtain a biological
16. Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988), cert, denied,
489 U.S. 1066 (1989).
17. 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987).
18. Id. at 1387-88.
19. ESA § 7(a)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4). As of 1989, there were 1,566
species of animals and 1,595 species of plants awaiting evaluation for listing on
the endangered and threatened species list. Gavin, What's Wrong with the
Questions We Ask in Wildlife Research?, 17(3) WILDLIFE Soc'Y BULL. 345, 348
(1989).
20. 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985).
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assessment.27 The court treated the application of 7(a)(2) to
proposed species as purely procedural; the federal agency is not
prevented from going forward with the contemplated action if the
FWS should find a likelihood of jeopardy, nor is the agency
prevented from making an irretrievable commitment of resources.22
Application of Section 7(a)(2) Outside U.S. Territory
A recent important case has expanded the scope of the duty
to insure no jeopardy to include agency action outside the territory
of the United States.23 In 1986, the FWS issued interpretive
regulations which provided that section 7(a)(2) did not apply to
federal agency action outside the United States.2"* The restriction of
the scope of section 7(a)(2) to domestic action removed protection
for over 500 species that occur exclusively outside the United States.25
In addition, it restricted the protection of migratory animals which
depend on habitat in foreign countries as well as in the United
States.26 As a result, the FWS regulations threatened to severely
hamper the ability of the ESA to protect species listed as threatened
or endangered. In Defenders of Wildlife v. Model, the court held that
the plain language of the ESA requires a determination of jeopardy
any time a federal agency action affects an endangered or threatened
species, regardless of whether the species occurs in a foreign country
or not.27
21. Id. at 1368.
22. Id.
23. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989), aff'd
911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990).
24. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a) (1987).
25. Id. § 17.11.
26. For a discussion of the extraterritorial application of section 7(a)(2), see
Comment, The International Applicability of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 171 (1989).
27. 707 F. Supp. at 1084-85.
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While the procedural requirements of 7(a)(2) continue to
evolve, recent interpretations of section 7(a)(l) and section 9 have led
to an expansion of the substantive portions of the ESA.
SECTION ?(A)(I): THE DUTY TO CONSERVE
Courts have interpreted section 7(a)(l) expansively in recent
cases. Section 7(a)(l) requires the Secretary of the Interior to use
programs administered by him to further the purposes of the ESA.
It also requires all other federal agencies, in consultation with the
Secretary, to use their authorities to further the purposes of the
ESA.2S Courts interpreting section 7(a)(l) have looked to the stated
purposes of the ESA to determine the extent of the duty imposed by
this section.
Section 2(b) states that the purposes of the ESA are to
conserve the ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened
species depend and also to provide programs for the conservation of
the endangered and threatened species themselves.29 The ESA
defines "conserve" as "the use of all methods and procedures which
are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species
to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter
are no longer necessary."50
Courts have thus interpreted section 7(a)(l) to require federal
agencies to act affirmatively in a manner that leads to the recovery
28. ESA § 7(a)(l), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(l). Section 7(a)(l) states:
[T]he Secretary shall review other programs administered by him
and utilize such programs in furtherance of the purposes of this
chapter. All other Federal agencies shall, in consultation with
and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities
in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out
programs for the conservation of endangered species and
threatened species listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title.
Id.
29. ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
30. ESA § 3(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
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of protected species. This affirmative duty to increase the
populations of protected species places a greater burden on federal
agencies than does the section 7(a)(2) duty to insure that agency
action is not likely to jeopardize the continued survival of protected
species. Under section 7(a)(l), it is no longer sufficient for a federal
agency to assert that it determined no jeopardy would result from its
contemplated action; instead, the agency must show that the
contemplated action will further the conservation of the protected
species in question.
Section 7(a)(l) was first addressed in Defenders of Wildlife v.
Andrus.31 The FWS issued hunting regulations that allowed hunting
of migratory game birds to begin one half hour before sunrise and to
continue one half hour after sunset. The regulations were challenged
by Defenders of Wildlife because of the concern that protected birds
could not be distinguished from other birds during times of low
visibility.52 Defenders of Wildlife argued that hunting should be
restricted to after sunrise and before sunset.55
The court interpreted section 7(a)(l) to require federal
agencies to conserve and increase populations of protected species.54
The FWS argued that the proper focus was whether the regulations
violated section 7(a)(2); that as long as the regulations did not
jeopardize the continued existence of a protected species, there was
no violation of the ESA.55 The court rejected this argument and held
that the definition of "conserve" provides that federal agencies "must
use all methods necessary. . . ."56 The FWS cannot limit its focus to
what it considers the most important management practice, in this
31. 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
32. Id. at 169.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 170.
35. Id. at 169.
36. Id. at 170.
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case the preservation of habitat, but must also consider other effects
on the protected species, including the effect of accidental shootings.57
The court held that the hunting regulations were arbitrary and could
not be upheld because the rulemaking process was not adequately
focused on the obligation to conserved
The second case addressing section 7(a)(l) also involved
hunting regulations issued by FWS. In Connor v. Andrus,39 hunters
challenged FWS regulations which banned all hunting in certain areas
because of the presence of the endangered Mexican Duck.40 The
plaintiffs claimed that there was no evidence that hunting in areas
where the Mexican Duck is present posed a threat to the species/7
The FWS did not refute this claim, instead arguing that it had an
affirmative duty to conserve species and had the discretion to choose
what regulations to issue in fulfillment of this duty/2
Although the court recognized the affirmative duty that section
7(a)(l) places on federal agencies, it held that this duty is not met by
regulations which do not address the causes of harm to a species/5
The court required federal agencies to establish a rational basis for
the promulgation of regulations/"* The court found no evidence that
the hunting ban would increase the population of the endangered
duck species and struck the regulations down/5
These two early cases applying section 7(a)(l) suggested that
regulations had to be justified by an administrative record that clearly
37. Id. at 170.
38. Id.
39. 453 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
40. Id. at 1039.
41. Id. at 1040.
42. Id. at 1041.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1041-42.
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established the regulations would indeed further the purposes of the
ESA. The extent to which agency regulations had to effectively
conserve protected species continued to develop in later cases. In
National Wildlife Federation v. Model,46 the National Wildlife
Federation challenged continued FWS approval of lead gunshot for
hunting in foraging areas of the protected bald eagle/7 The FWS
and the National Wildlife Federation agreed that lead gunshot caused
inadvertent poisoning of bald eagles/8 The FWS was actively
addressing the problem, but had decided to allow lead gunshot for
one more season/9 The National Wildlife Federation sought to
enjoin the approval of lead gunshot for the additional season, arguing
that continued approval was in contravention of the FWS's duty to
conserve protected species.50 The FWS acknowledged that it had a
duty under section 7(a)(l) to conserve protected species, but argued
that the duty does not abrogate the discretion to choose how to
achieve this end.57
The court held that the FWS regulations were arbitrary
because the FWS had failed to articulate a rational connection
between the factors found and the choice made.52 The court noted
that it could not uphold the choice the FWS made because the
decision to approve the continued use of lead gunshot was not
supported by a record indicating the factors considered by the FWS.55
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, Connor v. Andrus, and National
46. 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
47. Id. at 1090.
48. Id.
49. Id. The affected areas were limited to five states: California, Illinois,
Missouri, Oklahoma and Oregon. Id.
50. Id. at 1090-92.
51. Id. at 1092.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Wildlife Federation v. Hodel established that agency discretion in
promulgating regulations for the protection of species is limited.
More recently, however, courts have suggested that the agency should
be accorded greater deference. Litigation concerning the
promulgation of sea turtle regulations by the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) illustrates both a restrictive and a
deferential approach to agency responsibility under section 7(a)(l).
In Louisiana v. Verity,54 the court addressed the issue of
whether NMFS could promulgate regulations that focused on only
one cause of endangerment to sea turtles without addressing other
threats. The appellants, relying on Connor v. Andnis, argued that the
regulations violate section 7(a)(l) unless it can be shown that they
effectively conserve the protected species.55 The Fifth Circuit
accorded substantial deference to NMFS in interpreting section
7(a)(l). The Fifth Circuit held that NMFS had demonstrated that
the regulations adequately address the incidental takings of sea turtles
and that is all that it need demonstrate; an agency is not required to
demonstrate that the measures taken will save a species from
extinction.56
Despite the Fifth Circuit's holding, NMFS suspended the
regulations after shrimpers protested the regulations' enforcement.57
The National Wildlife Federation brought suit to enjoin the
suspension of the regulations.58 In reviewing the suspension of the
54. 853 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1988).
55. Id. at 332.
56. Id. at 333. The Fifth Circuit stated, "regulations aimed at preventing the
taking of a protected species cannot be invalidated on the ground that the record
fails to demonstrate that the regulatory effort will enhance the species' chance of
survival. Insofar as Connor v. Andnis . . . requires such a showing, we disapprove
its holding." Id.
57. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Mosbacher, No. 89-2089 (D.D.C. 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
58. Id.
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regulations, the district court accorded little deference to NMFS.59
The court treated the suspension of regulations as a conservation
measure and found it inadequate, stating, "[t]he Secretary has utterly
failed to show how the 45-day suspension of any protection for
endangered and threatened turtles, during the height of the Gulf
shrimping season, will foster conservation."60
When agency action differs from regulations of the type found
in Verity, section 7(a)(l) effectively acts as a bar to the action, unless
it can be shown that the species is benefitted. In Sierra Club v.
Clark,61 the court addressed an attempt by the FWS to implement a
sport hunting season on a threatened species, the eastern timber
wolf. The Eighth Circuit held that a sport hunting season of a
threatened species runs counter to the purposes of the ESA and that
the FWS had therefore violated its section 7(a)(l) duty to conserve
protected species.62 The FWS approved a sport hunting season
because it determined, pursuant to its section 7(a)(2) duty, that a
sport hunting season would not be likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of the eastern timber wolf. Sierra Club v. Clark illustrates
that under section 7(a)(l) it is no longer sufficient that an agency's
action meets the burden of insuring no jeopardy under section
7(a)(2). Applied in this manner, section 7(a)(l) subsumes section
7(a)(2).
The affirmative duty to further the purposes of the ESA by
conserving protected species is becoming a firmly established
59. The court accorded limited deference because "an agency changing its
course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change
beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first
instance." Id. (citation omitted). The suspension of regulations by NMFS is thus
a special circumstance that requires closer judicial scrutiny than would otherwise
be the case.
60. Id.
61. 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985).
62. Id.
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interpretation of section 7(a)(l). The extent of this duty and whether
the duty applies equally to all federal agencies is the focus of recent
cases interpreting section 7(a)(l).
In Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy District v. Watt,63 the
plaintiffs challenged the Secretary's decision not to sell water from
the Washoe water project, instead allocating all available water to the
endangered species found in Pyramid Lake.64 The plaintiffs argued
that the Secretary is required only to avoid jeopardizing the continued
survival of protected species, but the district court held that the
decision was proper because the Secretary has a duty to develop
programs for restoring protected species to the point where
protection of the ESA is no longer required.65
On appeal, the appellants argued that the Secretary's duty is
defined solely by section 7(a)(2) and therefore the Secretary is
authorized only to take actions that avoid jeopardizing the continued
existence of a protected species.66 The Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument, affirming the district court's interpretation that section
7(a)(l) specifically directs the Secretary to use programs administered
by him to further the conservation purposes of the ESA.67 The Ninth
Circuit held that section 7(a)(l) directs the Secretary to actively
pursue a species conservation policy, and that the ESA supports the
Secretary's decision to give priority to the endangered fish species
63. 549 F. Supp. 704 (D. Nev. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Carson-Truckee Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S.
1083 (1985).
64. Carson-Truckee, 549 F. Supp. at 709.
65. Id. at 710.
66. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 261 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985).
67. Id. at 261-62. The court distinguished agency action that is intended to
conserve a species from all other types of agency action, finding section 7(a)(2)
inapplicable when the action is intended to conserve a species. Id.
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until they no longer need the protection of the ESA.68 In support of
this interpretation of section 7(a)(l), the Ninth Circuit noted that
"Congress intended to 'halt and reverse the trend towards species
extinction, whatever the cost.'"69 The Ninth Circuit did not address
the question of whether section 7(a)(l) mandated the use of the
water entirely for conservation purposes had the Secretary chosen not
to allocate it to the endangered species.70
The most recent case addressing section 7(a)(l) also involved
the endangered species in Pyramid Lake and the threat posed to the
species by the diversion of water. In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v.
United States Department of Navy,71 the Navy argued that section
7(a)(l) requires Federal agencies to develop conservation programs
only to the extent that the programs are consistent with the primary
mission of the agency.72 The Tribe contended that the Navy has an
obligation to consider the range of alternative actions and adopt the
one least detrimental to protected species.75
The Ninth Circuit stated that section 7(a)(l) is neither as
expansive as the Tribe proposed nor as limited as the Navy argued.74
According to the Ninth Circuit, the Tribe's interpretation of section
7(a)(l) would divest Federal agencies of all discretion in determining
68. Id. at 262.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 262 n.5.
71. 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990). In this case, the appellants argued that the
Navy's use of water to minimize dust and enhance safety at a desert flight training
station violated the duty to conserve protected species. Id. at 1417. The Navy
leases water rights from the Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy District to local
farmers who irrigate crops around the runways at Fallen airforce base. The crops
minimize dust around the runways, thereby enhancing visibility for planes taking
off and landing. Id. at 1412.
72. Id. at 1417.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1417-18.
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how to fulfill the duty to conserve.7:> The discretion to be afforded
Federal agencies is not as great as the Navy argued, however. The
Ninth Circuit held that the plain language of the ESA indicates
endangered and threatened species are to be afforded the highest
priority, and the legislative history makes it clear that this priority is
not to be tempered by the primary missions of federal agencies.76
The Ninth Circuit qualified the legislative history of the ESA,
however, by noting that Congress had amended the ESA since
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, indicating a modification of the
previous policy that species be preserved at all costs.77 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the Navy did not
abuse its discretion in violation of section 7(a)(l).78
The facts in Pyramid Lake favored the Navy; the FWS
approved the Navy's action and found no violation of section
7(a)(2).79 FWS's approval was one reason the Ninth Circuit
concluded that section 7(a)(l) had not been violated. In addition, the
Ninth Circuit noted that the Navy's actions were not placing the
endangered species in Pyramid Lake in grave danger, and therefore
75. Id. at 1418.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1418 n.16. The example the Nin th Circuit provided in support of this
suggestion was the creation of the exemption process which allows agencies, in
circumscribed instances, to have their actions exempted from the requirements of
section 7(a)(2). Id. Since the Congressional amendments, however, courts have
continued to cite TVA v. Hill for the proposition that endangered species are to
be given the highest priority. See, e.g., Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n
v. E.P.A, 684 F.2d 1041, 1049 (1st Cir. 1982) ("Agencies continue to be under a
substantive mandate to 'use all methods and procedures which are necessary to
prevent the loss of any endangered species, regardless of the cost'") (emphasis
omitted). See also Erdheim, The Wake of the Snail Darter: Insuring the Effectiveness
of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 629, 636 (1981) ("The
most significant fact about the amendments . . . was that the substantive standard
. . . [was] not changed.").
78. Pyramid Lake, 898 F.2d at 1419.
79. Id. at 1418.
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JVA v. Hill did not compel adoption of the Tribe's demanding
interpretation of section 7(a)(l).80 Based on these facts, the Ninth
Circuit noted that even under a stringent interpretation of section
7(a)(l), the Navy would probably not be found in violation of the
ESA.8'
Although resolution of Pyramid Lake did not require a probing
analysis of section 7(a)(l), the Ninth Circuit took the opportunity to
consider the scope of section 7(a)(l). The court distinguished
agencies within the Department of Interior (DOI) from all other
Federal agencies, explaining that while section 7(a)(l) imposes an
affirmative duty on non DOI agencies, that duty is not as great as
the duty placed on DOI agencies.82 The Ninth Circuit based its
holding on the fact that FWS regulations governing interagency
consultation provide that conservation recommendations made by the
FWS to other Federal agencies are considered "advisory"85 thus the
action agency has discretion to decide whether to implement FWS
conservation recommendations.8^
80. Id.
81. Id. The Ninth Circuit did not find the endangered species to be in grave
danger as a result of the navy's activities, nor did it find that the Tribe's
recommendations would be particularly helpful. The court stated, "our reasoning
hinges primarily on the [district] court's finding that the Tribe's proposals would
be of 'insignificant effect upon the availability of water...'" "An 'insignificant'
conservation measure in the context of ESA is oxymoronic..." The court went on
to note that the ESA definition of "conserve" contemplates only the use of all
methods which are necessary. Id.
82. Id. The court focused on DOI because the FWS, a DOI agency, is the
most active agency in wildlife conservation, and because the endangered species in
Pyramid Lake are the responsibility of the FWS. However, the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), a Department of Commerce agency, shares responsibility
for species conservation under the ESA. In accordance with the Ninth Circuit's
analysis, NMFS, as well as agencies under the DOI, should be distinguished from
all other Federal agencies because their primary mission is the conservation and
management of flora and fauna.
83. Id. n.18 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.14Q) (1989)).
84. Id.
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Pyramid Lake narrows the scope of responsibility for non-DOI
agencies. After Pyramid Lake, however, the extent to which non-
DOI agencies must adopt conservation measures when the failure to
do so would place a protected species in grave danger, is still unclear.
Because Pyramid Lake is not a compelling case factually, it is likely
courts will continue to interpret section 7(a)(l) strictly for all Federal
agencies when it is plain that failure to adopt conservation measures
will result in harm to the species.85
SECTION 9: THE TAKING PROHIBITION
Section 9(a)(l)(B)86 is an increasingly important provision of
the ESA. Although a number of prior wildlife laws contained
provisions prohibiting the taking of animals, none have been as broad
in scope as section 9(a)(l)(B).87 Section 9(a)(l)(B) makes it unlawful
to "take" any species listed as endangered pursuant to section 4 of the
ESA.88 Section 3(19) defines "take" as, "to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct."89 The section 9 taking prohibition is
broader in scope than traditional taking prohibitions largely because
85. In situations where the facts more closely resemble TVA v. Hill, courts will
find it difficult to ignore the legislative history cited by the Supreme Court in TVA
v. Hill. Representative Dingell made it clear section 1 was intentionally stringent
when he stated, "'The purposes of the bill included the conservation of the species
and of the ecosystems upon which they depend, and every agency of government is
committed to see that those purposes are carried out . . ."' TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 184 (1978) (quoting 119 CONG. REC. 42913 (1973)).
86. ESA § 9(a)(l)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B).
87. For a discussion of the historical development of the takings prohibition,
see Field, The Evolution of the Wildlife Taking Concept from its Beginning to its
Culmination in the Endangered Species Act, 21 Hous. L. REV. 457 (1984).
88. The prohibitions contained in section 9(a) are limited specifically to
endangered species. ESA § 9(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). The Secretary can make
section 9(a)(l) applicable to threatened species on a case by case basis pursuant
to section 4(d). ESA § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § I533(d).
89. ESA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
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of the definition the FWS gave "harm" in its agency regulations. The
FWS defined "harm" to include environmental degradation that
injures or kills wildlife by significantly disrupting essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.90
The first case to illustrate the potential reach of section 9 was
Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources (Palila I).91
In Palila I, a number of citizen groups brought suit against the state
agency managing the habitat of the endangered Palila, a finch-billed
member of the Hawaiian Honeycreeper family.92 For a number of
years, the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources had
been managing a population of feral goats in the Palila's critical
habitat in order to provide hunting opportunities for sportsmen.95
The plaintiffs challenged this practice because the feral goats were
causing damage to the vegetation upon which the Palila depended for
its survival.9'' The district court held that the maintenance of feral
goats in the Palila's critical habitat amounted to an unlawful taking
under section 9.95
On appeal, the appellants argued that no taking had occurred
because appellees could not show the Palila to be in danger of
reaching a population level from which the species could not
recover.96 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this argument, noting that the
presence of feral goats in the Palila's habitat satisfied the FWS's
definition of "harm" because the goats caused "significant
90. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1989).
91. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
92. Id. at 988.
93. Id. at 989. For a thorough discussion of the background events leading to
litigation, see Tobin, Interorganizalional Implementation of the Endangered Species
Act: A Hawaiian Case Study, 4 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 309 (1989).
94. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 990.
95. Id. at 995.
96. Palila I, 639 F.2d at 497.
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environmental modification or degradation" which actually injures or
kills wildlife.97 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, noting
that Congress had been informed that habitat destruction is a primary
threat to endangered species.98 In Palila I, there had been no federal
agency action; had there been, the destruction of habitat that had
been designated critical" could have been found to violate section
7(a)(2).;w Section 9 thus acts to protect critical habitat from threats
that are not covered by section 7(a)(2).
Palila I indicated that section 9 of the ESA has a broader scope
than previous taking prohibitions. The plaintiffs did not have to
produce evidence of the mortality of specific individuals to succeed
on a taking claim; they merely had to show that the Palila's survival
was dependant on the last remaining mamane-naio forest, which the
feral goats were destroying. After Palila I, the extent of the scope of
section 9 still remained uncertain, however.
In Palila II,101 the district court again addressed the threat to
the Palila. In the interim, the FWS had redefined "harm."702 In
interpreting the new FWS definition of "harm", the court reaffirmed
that "harm" can include significant habitat destruction/"** While
noting that harm to wildlife includes altering essential behavioral
patterns, the court appeared to l imit the notion of harm to negative
97. Id.
98. Id. at 498.
99. 50 C.F.R. § 17.95 (1990). The Palila's habitat was designated as a critical
habitat in 1977.
100. Section 7(a)(2) requires Federal agencies to insure their actions will not
"result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat...which is
determined...to be critical." ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
101. Palila v. Hawaii Dep'l of Land & Natural Resources (Palila II), 649 F.
Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
102. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981).
103. Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1075. The court held the amended definition
did not substantively change the previous definition of harm. Id.
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impacts on a species which threaten the continued existence or
« 7/1,*
recovery of a species/"*
After Pallia II, for section 9 to be violated under a "harm"
analysis, a showing must be made that the harm to individual
organisms has an effect at the population or species level. The
court's discussion of harm implicitly incorporates the analyses of
sections 7(a)(l) and 7(a)(2). A determination that the harm
threatens the survival of the species incorporates the section 7(a)(2)
analysis of "not likely to jeopardize the continued survival," and a
determination that harm threatens the recovery of a species is similar
to the section 7(a)(l) analysis of a "duty to conserve."
In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States Department of the
Navy, the Ninth Circuit appeared to limit the holding in Pallia I,
suggesting a finding of harm can be made only when the survival of
a species is threatened/05 This type of injury requirement was met
easily in Pallia I and Pallia II.106 In Sierra Club v. Lyng,107 a recent
case dealing with harm to the red-cockaded woodpecker as a result
of timber harvesting, this requirement was also met. In Lyng, the
habitat at issue was not the sole habitat of the species, but the court
nonetheless found that degradation of this habitat would impact the
species sufficiently to consider it a threat to the continued existence
of the species.708 Sierra Club v. Lyng is significant because it
104. Id. The court stated, "this would include activities that significantly
impair essential behavioral patterns to the extent that there is an actual negative
impact or injury to the endangered species, threatening its continued existence or
recovery." Id.
105. 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990).
106. The habitat of the Palila had been designated critical, and the sole
population of the species was dependent on that habitat; thus any damage to the
Palila's habitat threatened the species as a whole.
107. 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part, vacated in part sub nom.
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
108. The court made a finding of fact that by 1995 the red-cockaded
woodpecker would be extinct in Texas. Id. at 1266.
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expanded the reach of section 9 by establishing that the section 9
prohibition against harm includes habitats relied upon by populations
of an endangered species, regardless of whether the habitat has been
designated critical habitat or not/09
Section 9 is an effective bar to other indirect harms in addition
to habitat destruction. In National Wildlife Federation v. Model,110 the
court held that the continued approval of lead gunshot by the FWS
when it was known that lead caused inadvertent poisonings of
protected species constituted a taking. The EPA's registration of
strychnine for above-ground use was similarly held to be a taking
violation because protected species, as well as the intended pest
species, died from the strychnine/7' In Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA,
the Eighth Circuit held that a "taking occurs when the challenged
activity has 'some prohibited impact on an endangered species."'772
The court determined that the EPA's strychnine registration had a
prohibited impact on endangered species/75 Because strychnine can
be used only if it is registered, the Eighth Circuit held that the EPA
registration constituted a taking and upheld the district court's
injunction of the registration/7"7
109. No critical habitat has been designated for the red-cockaded woodpecker.
See 50 C.F.R. § 17.95 (1990). In fact, critical habitat has been designated for only
10 of 67 birds on the list. Id.
110. 23 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
111. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989).
112. Id. at 1300-01, (citing Pallia I, 639 F.2d at 497, and Lyng, 694 F. Supp.
at 1268-72).
113. Id. at 1301. To support this determination, the court cited NWF v.
Hodel, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA). 1089, 1092-93 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
114. Id. The court went on to note that the taking was not permitted because
the EPA had no authorization from the FWS for the incidental takings. Id. The
registration was struck down even though the EPA was acting under authority
granted by the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA); the
court held that a Federal agency must still comply with the ESA, even if acting
under a different statute. Id. at 1299 (citing Conservation Law Found, v. Andrus,
623 F.2d 712, 715 (1st Cir. 1979)). It had been established as early as 1979, in
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After National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel and Defenders of
Wildlife v. EPA, agency activities, no matter how remote, may be
found to violate section 9 if they facilitate actions by third parties
which have a prohibited impact on endangered species. Palila II also
suggests a departure from a number of cases which held that section
9 does not protect against prospective harm/"5 In Palila II, the court
rejected the defendant's argument that any effect the sheep had on
the vegetation was only a potential harm that is not covered under
the definition of harm/ /6 The court stated, "Congress could not have
intended such a shortsighted and limited interpretation of 'harm.' A
finding of 'harm' does not require . . . a finding that habitat
degradation is presently driving the species further toward
extinction.""7
Recent cases interpreting section 9 have thus expanded the
prohibition to include injury that is prospective and to cover remote
actions that facilitate takings by third parties. The interpretation of
section 9 and section 7(a)(l) in recent cases suggests the sections are
collapsing into a single analysis. Under the "harm" analysis of section
9, courts are beginning to determine whether the action hinders the
recovery of a species, an analysis similar to that used under section
7(a)(l). Once section 9 has been found to be violated, courts have
Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrus, that section 7(a)(2) of the ESA applied
of its own force, regardless of what statute a Federal agency was acting under.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator, EPA, establishes that this analysis applies
to section 9 as well.
115. See California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1388 (CD. Cal. 1981), ajfd 683
F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) ("in
prohibiting 'taking,' the draftsmen . . . envisioned a more immediate injury"); North
Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 362 (D.D.C. 1980) ("injunctive relief
should not. . . issue unless danger to the protected species is sufficiently imminent
or certain").
116. Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1075.
117. Id.
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been quick to find a section 7(a)(l) violation as well.778 The growing
interdependence of section 9 and section 7(a)(l) provides greater
force to both sections and thus enhances the conservation of species
under the framework of the ESA.
CONCLUSION
Recent interpretations of the substantive sections of the ESA
have focused increasingly on the question of the recovery of a
species, rather than on the question of whether a species' survival is
threatened. This analysis shifts the focus to the purposes of the ESA,
the conservation of species, to the point where the protection of the
ESA is no longer required. This emphasis on the purposes of the
ESA results in an outcome determinative analysis which effectively
protects species when sufficient information is before the court. If
the information before the court indicates that recovery of the species
will be hindered, it is likely the contemplated action will be barred.
Recent interpretation of the ESA has thus expanded the reach of the
Act, providing a more comprehensive system for protecting
threatened and endangered species.
118. See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in pan,
vacated in pan sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991);
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (E.D. Cal 1985).
